Saturday, April 9, 2011

UK Government discusses blocking copyright infringing websites

Related Posts Plugin for WordPress, Blogger...

Communications Minister Ed Vaizey has held talks behind closed doors with rights holders and ISPs about introducing web blocking for sites that breach copyright

DHS in the US has already seized thousands of domains
"suspected" of violating Copyright laws
.
Dinah Greek
Computer Active

The Government is considering forcing internet service providers (ISPs) to block websites that make it possible for people to illegally share copyrighted material.

Communications Minister Ed Vaizey confirmed on the Open Rights Group blog that he has been involved in behind-closed-doors discussions with copyright holders and ISPs about introducing these measures after a legal challenge from BT and Talktalk to the Digital Economy Act (DEA).

The entertainment industry wanted the law to force ISPs to write warning letters to alleged file sharers but ISPs say they fear this would breach data protection laws.

This issue is now subject to a judicial review in the High Court and the Government has put on hold the requirement for ISPs to write warning letters.

Read Full Article

Enter your email address to subscribe to our newsletter:


Delivered by FeedBurner

Friday, April 1, 2011

Copyright or Censorship? (Video)

Related Posts Plugin for WordPress, Blogger...

Youtube - alawson911
It is my contention that spurious accusations of copyright infringement can be used to suppress videos that are not liked, in certain circles, and that YouTube's reporting procedure favours the accuser over the accused, who is not even given the minimum amount of information necessary to be able to challenge any claim, let alone a false one -- Anthony Lawson.



Enter your email address to subscribe to our newsletter:


Delivered by FeedBurner

Monday, March 28, 2011

Supporters of DHS Domain Name Seizures Undervalue Important Constitutional Protections

Related Posts Plugin for WordPress, Blogger...



David Makarewicz, Contributing Writer
Activist Post

This site has been generally critical of recent United States policy toward copyright issues.  We have expressed discomfort with the Obama Administration's statements in support of Internet freedom, which seem to clash with a proposal to wiretap suspected infringers and the introduction of COICA legislation.

The most troubling issue has undoubtedly been the series of Government domain name seizures, through which the DHS takes the domain names of accused infringers without first giving the accused a chance to defend their site at a hearing.

Although we question the Constitutionality of the seizures, these issues deserve a vigorous debate that presents the well-reasoned arguments of all sides, including those that are convinced that the Government seizures are right and legal.  Unfortunately, last week, Terry Hart of Copyhype, who has been a vocal defender of the domain name seizures, chose to go beyond that defense to question the motives of the critics of the domain name seizures such as SitesAndBlogs.com and Techdirt.comand attempted to dismiss the importance of the Constitutional issues we have raised.In his article, ICE Seizures Criticism: Magic Words, Hart doubles down on his pro-seizure beliefs, again arguing that the seizures are Constitutional and can be a "valuable tool for minimizing the harms of piracy."  However, Hart also went one step further and accused critics of the seizures of failing to provide "real arguments" and hiding behind Constitutional catch-phrases like "due process" and "prior restraint."  Hart said:
Nevertheless, criticisms seem to return again and again to the same charges — No due process! Prior restraint! — as though repeating these words enough will magically make domain name seizures unconstitutional.
But it won’t.
Our article, entitled Arrest Of Website Operator Renews Debate Over Constitutionality of Government Domain Seizures, was one of the criticisms of the seizures that Hart takes issue with.  In the article, we discuss five Constitutional issues that arise because the Government has taken private property, and arguably suppressed speech, without prior notice and a hearing.

Hart's implication that our article is one whose argument consists of a hysterical mantra of repeated magical phrases is unfair.  Of the nearly 3000 words in our post, the phrase "due process" only appears twelve times and "prior restraint" only seven.

Before we get to our detailed response to Hart, it is important to make one thing clear.  By stating that we do not believe that the Constitution allows the Government to take private property, which may include protected speech, without a judicial hearing, we are not favoring the copyright infringers over the copyright holders or saying that the Government should not enact laws that protect its citizens' copyrights.  These are separate issues, worthy of their own debate.

If a person believes that the Government should not torture and kill a suspected murderer, that does not mean that person favors murderers over victims.  It merely means that they believe that even when confronted with wrongdoing, there are limits to the actions the Government can take against its citizens.  The same is true here.  We can be troubled by the effects of copyright infringement and still believe that the Constitution does not permit the Government to seize domains in the manner it did.

Hart divides his article into the reasons he believes the domain name seizures are acceptable under the Fourth, Fifth and First Amendment.  I will take each of these in turn.

FOURTH AMENDMENT

Hart begins by arguing that there is no Fourth Amendment problem with the domain name seizures because they were accompanied by warrants issued upon probable cause.  The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Other commentators have suggested that the factual and legal errors in the Government's affidavits create a Fourth Amendment problem.  Although it is a worthwhile argument and I am troubled by the poor quality of the affidavits, I ultimately think that the Fourth Amendment requirements are met.  The warrants issue upon probable cause and a sufficient description.  That is probably enough to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.

FIFTH AMENDMENT

Although the domain seizures marginally pass under the Fourth Amendment, the Government's actions do not satisfy Fifth Amendment due process protections.

The Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."   Due process typically means that individuals must receive notice and a meaningful hearing before the Government takes away their property.

Hart first argues that the Government provides due process for the ultimate forfeitures (as opposed to the initial seizures) because of the availability of notice and a hearing.  Here we generally agree.  Nothing has yet convinced me that the forfeitures themselves run afoul of the Fifth Amendment.  However, where Hart and I part ways is his next argument that the seizures of the domains without prior notice or a hearing satisfy due process requirements.  He argues:
The more realistic criticism is a far narrower one: do these seizures require that the hearing occurs before the domain name is seized.  This is the criticism that Makarewicz raises.  He states, “This right to prior notice and hearing is not a minor legal technicality.  It is an indispensable aspect of due process.  It is the only way an individual can protect himself from the Government arbitrarily or mistakenly depriving him of property before it happens.”  He goes on to correctly point out that, despite this indispensable aspect, “Over the years, the courts have carved out certain limited exceptions to the pre-deprivation notice and hearing requirement.”
Makarewicz concludes that these exceptions aren’t present here; the seizures aren’t exempted from the requirement to provide a hearing before they occur. I disagree.
Hart then cites a series of cases that supposedly support the Constitutionality of the seizures despite the lack of notice or hearing.  SitesAndBlogs is not a lawblog directed at lawyers, so I do not want to bore my non-lawyer readers by forcing them into the middle of a case-for-case exchange.  However, with complex issues such as this, the devil is in the details and the details are in the case law that Hart cites to support his arguments.

For example, Hart points to the US v. E-Gold and US v. Bajakajian cases to support his claim that "the question of whether the statutes used to seize these domain names requires a pre-seizure hearing has been answered."  A powerful statement that could end the conversation if the cases, in fact, clearly supported the Government's right to seize domains without a pre-deprivation hearing.  A review of the courts' decisions in these cases shows that they do not go nearly that far.

The E-Gold case that Hart cites involved very different circumstances than the domain name seizures.  In E-Gold, the Government seized $1,481,976.38 from a defendant allegedly involved in a money laundering scheme without providing a pre-deprivation hearing.  The D.C. Court of Appeals reiterated the rule that a Government taking prior to notice and a hearing is not the norm, but is limited to "extraordinary circumstances."  However, the Court found that seizing money from a money launderer before he can spend or hide the funds is the kind of extraordinary circumstances that permit the Government to seize the funds prior to a hearing.  The Court stated:
It may well be that in the case of a criminal proceeding in which the government may ultimately have rights in the property at issue, immediate protective measures must be taken in order to prevent dissipation or deterioration of the assets before the time for trial is reached.
The Court permitted the seizure of E-Gold's funds without a hearing because of "the ease of disposition of valuable assets."  That simply does not apply to the domain seizures.

Unlike money in the hands of an accused money launderer, immediate protective measures did not have to be taken in order to prevent dissipation or deterioration of the domain names before a hearing.  The Government had every reason to believe that if it notified E-Gold that it was scheduled for a hearing in two weeks, that E-Gold would move a substantial portion of the money around so that the Government would not be able to take control of the $1,481,976.38 after the hearing.

Did the Government have any reason to believe that if it notified the owners of the seized domains that a hearing was scheduled in two weeks, that the domains would not be just as easy to seize after the hearing?


You can not decrease the value of a domain like you can with other assets.  You also can't move and hide a domain the way that you can with money, drugs, cars or boats.  If the Government has some reason to believe that a targeted domain will somehow be degraded or hid in a way that I have not conceived, shouldn't the Government at least have to articulate that it has reason to believe that the owner of the particular domain intends to hide or degrade the domain before dispensing with normal due process protections?

The other major case that Hart relies on is the Bajakajian case, in which the Supreme Court ruled that a customs seizure of a large sum of money did not violate the Eighth Amendment, which states that "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."  It might be interesting to debate whether the severe and permanent damage a DHS seizure imposes on a website violates the Eighth Amendment.  However, it is not a point that most critics have made in the past and it is not immediately clear how a case analyzing the Eighth Amendment relates to the Fifth Amendment due process issue.

Due process is not a catch phrase.  Due process is there to protect citizens from Government oppression.  And due process, in the form of a predeprivation hearing, should only be suspended on the rarest of occasions.  As the Supreme Court reminded the Government in the 1991 Doehr case, "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights . . . .[And n]o better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and an opportunity to meet it."

Doehr also demonstrates that the trend is toward strengthening due process protection.  In Doehr, the Supreme Court struck down a procedure that allowed a prejudgment attachment of a defendant's property.   Even though the procedure had been permitted by lower courts for decades, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant's property could not be attached without prior notice and a hearing, unless a specific showing could be made that a particular defendant was intending to put the property in jeopardy.  I see no reason that the same Fifth Amendment protection should not granted to the owners of websites accused of copyright infringement.

FIRST AMENDMENT

Like his due process claim, Hart's dismissive claim that critics have hid behind the words "prior restraint" is unfair.

Hart concedes that the seizure of expressive materials without a prior judicial determination that they were not protected by the First Amendment is traditionally an unconstitutional prior restraint.  However, he attempts to claim the domain name seizures are Constitutional by arguing that the domain names are not speech, some First Amendment protections are limited to obscenity and that it is permissible to suppress non-infringing speech with infringing speech.  Although the freedom of speech issue is a closer call than the due process issue, I disagree with his analysis.

The First Amendment's protections are powerful, but not unlimited.  In fact, copyright law, by its very nature, restricts speech.  Additionally, the law is fairly clear that speech that infringes another's copyright is not protected by the Constitution.  However, at the time of the seizures, no hearing has been held and no Court has yet determined that the contents of the website are infringing.  Such a determination might be months or years away.  Thus, the sites should be afforded full Constitutional protection.

Hart first argues that "the key distinction is that it is only the property interest in a domain name that is being seized here, not the content of the web site itself or the servers that the content resides on."  In other words, Hart is arguing that the domain names are not speech, so the Government has not suppressed speech by taking the domain names.

It is fair to say that a domain name itself is not speech.  Hart is also correct that once you take away the domain name, the content of the website containing the speech still exists on a server.  However, seizing a domain name places a wedge between the audience and the speech, so I do not agree that the domain names should not be treated as Constitutionally protected speech.

If the domain names can somehow be separated from the speech on the servers they are connected to, how can the Government seize the domain names based on a claim that some of the speech on the servers infringes on copyright?  In the affidavit for last month's sports streaming site domain name seizures, ICE states:
There is probable cause to believe that the SUBJECT DOMAIN NAMES are subject to seizure and forfeiture, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§2323(a)(1)(A)-(B) as property used or intended to be used to commit or facilitate the commission of criminal infringement of copyrights in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2319.
In other words, in order to get the magistrate judge to sign off on the domain name seizure, ICE attests that the domain names are an integral aspect of the speech that it believes to be illegal.  

Neither the Government nor Hart can have it both ways.  Either the domain name is an integral enough aspect of copyright infringement that it can be seized and it gets First Amendment protection, or a domain name is not an integral enough aspect of copyright infringement to be considered protected speech, but then the Government can't seize the domain name in the first place.

Since the seizure of the domain names interferes with speech that a court has not yet found to be illegal, the seizure is a prior restraint.  Hart attempts to minimize critics' claims of prior restraint by including a partial quote from the Supreme Court.  Hart states:
For that very reason, prior restraint is very powerful as a magic word.  So much so that the Supreme Court has addressed the need for caution.  “The phrase “prior restraint” is not a self-wielding sword,” it said in Kingsley Books v. Brown.  “Nor can it serve as a talismanic test.”
With these words, the Court was not weakening a citizen's ability to claim a Government prior restraint.  The Court was merely reminding litigants that free speech protection, even as to prior restraint, is not completely unlimited.  This is not disputed.  However, it is important to note that the Court also reminds the Government that "the limitation is the exception; it is to be closely confined so as to preclude what may fairly be deemed licensing or censorship."

The Kingsley Books case primarily stands for the proposition that the Government can limit free speech protection only on the very rare occasion that the Government has created a series of precise rules to ensure that their actions will not restrain future speech that has not yet determined to be illegal.  The case is also limited to restraining obscene materials (which the Court does not consider protected speech) where the Government assures that the obscenity issue will be "promptly tried and adjudicated."

Similarly, in Freedman v. Maryland, the Court stated that any restraint imposed in advance of a hearing must be "for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution . . . [and] the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision."  Typically, this means that the time between a seizure and a hearing, should be measured in hours, not days or weeks.

The domain name seizures do not involve obscenity and the Government has not put in place procedures that assure that future speech will not be restrained or that a determination of copyright infringement will be promptly tried and adjudicated after the seizure. Thus, the domain name seizures do not fit within the narrow exception to the ban on prior restraint.

Even this narrow prior restraint exception was unacceptable for four of the Justices in Kingsley Books, who dissented from even allowing that.  In his dissent, Justice Douglas warned of the dangers allowing the Government to issue a decree against a publisher in secret.  He said:
We tread here on First Amendment grounds.  And nothing is more devastating to the rights that it guarantees than the power to restrain publication before even a hearing is held.  This is prior restraint and censorship at its worst.
Justice Douglas was not just hiding behind "magic words" to argue it is unconstitutional for the Government to restrain speech that no court had yet ruled to be illegal.  He recognized that even if the Government is fighting a well-intentioned fight against obscenity or copyright infringement, it can not be allowed to bypass the court without becoming an oppressive censor.

Modern Constitutional experts agree with Justice Douglas.  Professors Mark Lemley and Eugene Volokh wrote that a court should not be allowed to issue any injunction that suppresses speech without a hearing and a high burden of proof, such as "high probability of success on the merits" because "oversuppression of speech is considerably worse than underprotection of the government interest."

In his article, Hart also seems to imply that obscene materials would be given more First Amendment protection than the speech within the seized domains.  The opposite is true.  In fact, obscenity is one of the only exceptions to prior restraint rules that the Courts have accepted, in addition to important interests like national security matters, incitements to violence and overthrow of orderly government.

Despite this, Hart claims that since the domain name seizures involve alleged copyright infringement, rather than obscenity, the Government should have a broader right to take the property without a hearing.  He states:
Whether a specific work is obscene or not is a legal determination, one that cannot be made by law enforcement officials, which is why courts have called for stronger procedural safeguards when obscene materials are seized.  Factual, objective determinations, however, can be made by law enforcement officials.  Thus, these procedural safeguards are not needed when items are seized for violating child pornography laws; law enforcement officials don’t need a judge to determine that something depicts a minor engaged in explicit sexual conduct.
Here, Hart is referencing the US v. Kimbrough case, in which the Supreme Court found that a warrant did not need to be more specific in order to search through a Defendant's possessions.  However, this was not a First Amendment case.  The point of limiting the search to factual, objective determinations is that the officers need to be able to determine whether or not the items they are searching and seizing are the same items that are described in the warrant.  This is primarily a Fourth Amendment issue that does not discuss prior restraint.

Fortunately, despite Hart's implication, the Kimbrough Court was not saying that the Government can suppress speech without a hearing as long as the police are capable of unilaterally determining whether or not the speech is protected by the Constitution. It is one thing to allow the police to determine what items fit the description of a warrant; It is entirely another for the police to be empowered to determine whether or not the items are protected by the First Amendment.

Even if the First Amendment was stretched so far that suppressing an item containing speech is Constitutional if it is based on a single factual determination (such as the age of a child in a picture), these domain seizures would still not be permissible.  Application of copyright law to the Internet can not be simplified to a single factual question that the police can answer without the court.  For example, what is the factual determination that conclusively demonstrates that a website that provides links to another site that has streamed copyrighted sporting events in the past is not Constitutionally protected speech?

The courts have not even had a chance to fully consider many of these particular issues.  In fact, even the DHS does not know exactly how an act like streaming fits in the law, which is why they have asked Congress to clarify whether or not certain Copyright laws include streaming.  With this level of uncertainty, it would be madness to compromise the general rule that a Government suppression of speech, prior to a judicial determination, is an unconstitutional prior restraint.

Mike Masnick at Techdirt has delivered his own acid-laced response to Hart's defense of the Government's actions.  In his article, Defending The Indefensible: Lawyers Who Love Loopholes Ignoring Serious Constitutional Issues In Domain Seizures, Masnick does a nice job articulating the broader policy reasons that the United States Government can not be permitted to have this dangerous weapon at their disposal.  He says:
We've already seen governments in other countries use questionable copyright claims to stifle the speech of critics.  And it's not difficult to see how this could happen in the US as well -- especially given the recent domain seizures.  Considering the vast number of perfectly legal sites seized, how hard would it be for political operatives to target critical sites using a similar "copyright" claim?  Not hard at all.  And that's why we protect our First Amendment rights quite strongly.
Masnick is absolutely right.  That is why this issue matters.  Virtually every site that questions the Government has probably had part of an article or a picture that is arguably a copyright violation (or has at least linked to a site that does.)  Only the magic words of the Constitution prevents the Government from having the power to take down Techdirt and leave Copyhype standing.

David Makarewicz is an attorney practicing internet law concerning privacy rights and copyright defense for websites and blogs. Visit Dave at Sites and Blogs to keep up with breaking Internet news.




Enter your email address to subscribe to our newsletter:


Delivered by FeedBurner
order non hybrid seeds

Saturday, March 19, 2011

White House Wants It To Be A Felony To Stream Infringing Materials



Wikimedia Commons Image
David Makarewicz, Contributing Writer
Activist Post

One aspect of the White Paper that has grabbed headlines is the Obama Administration's recommendation that Congress clarify that felony copyright infringement includes infringement by streaming.  The current legal definition of felony copyright infringement only references "distribution" and "reproduction," which does not clearly include streaming.

There is some room to debate whether felony-level penalties (up to 10 years imprisonment) are too harsh for any intellectual property offense such as this or whether there are legitimate reasons to treat streaming different than other methods of distribution and reproduction.  However, asking Congress to clarify an unclear law is generally a reasonable request.
The problem comes from the fact that, rather than just make that simple, straight-forward recommendation, the Administration has chosen to cloak their request in cryptic language that makes it unclear exactly what it is that they are asking for.  The White Paper reads as follows:
It is imperative that our laws account for changes in technology used by infringers. One recent technological change is the illegal streaming of content. Existing law provides felony penalties for willful copyright infringement, but felony penalties are predicated on the defendant either illegally reproducing or distributing the copyrighted work. Questions have arisen about whether streaming constitutes the distribution of copyrighted works (and thereby is a felony) and/or performance of those works (and thereby is a not a felony). These questions have impaired the criminal enforcement of copyright laws. To ensure that Federal copyright law keeps pace with infringers, and to ensure that DOJ and U.S. law enforcement agencies are able to effectively combat infringement involving new technology, the Administration recommends that Congress clarify that infringement by streaming, or by means of other similar new technology, is a felony in appropriate circumstances.
The most troubling phrase is "infringement by streaming, or by means of other similar new technology, is a felony in appropriate circumstances."  If Congress acts on this, the language of the bill will have to be closely studied to determine exactly what activities fall into the category of "other similar new technology" and exactly what are the "appropriate circumstances."

Intellectual Property Brief called this recommendation "the biggest eyebrow raiser in this document."  They suggest that whether streaming is a method of distribution or merely a performance is a legal question that has not been resolved by the courts and the Administration's attempt to change the law to fit their interpretation is an attempt "to circumvent that question."  Additionally, they are concerned that the ambiguous phrasing will cast too wide a net:
The two sections that stand out as real wild cards here however are “in appropriate circumstances,” and “other similar new technology.” “Appropriate circumstances” raises an entire host of questions regarding what types of streams would carry felony penalties, not to mention questions about who would actually incur liability for a particular stream. Would liability be limited to the host itself, or would embedding the infringing stream also qualify? Likewise, “similar new technology” is completely ambiguous in its scope, and comes across as a catch-all grab to avoid the need for analyzing the infringement impact of future technologies.
Determining exactly what "similar new technology" any new law will reference is essential.  There are enormous differences between punishments for felony copyright infringement and misdemeanor copyright infringement.

Felony copyright infringement (18 U.S.C. §§ 2319(b)17 U.S.C. § 506(a)), by a first-time offender, "for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain," for the willful, unauthorized "reproduction or distribution" of copyrighted works, with a retail value of more than $2,500 is generally punishable by imprisonment of up to 5 years and a $250,000 fine.  It is slightly less if not done for a private financial gain and significantly more if the defendant is a repeat offender (the imprisonment doubles to a maximum of 10 years.)

Penalties for a misdemeanor offense are much less harsh.  A defendant is generally guilty of a misdemeanor violation if he violated intellectual property rights other than those of reproduction or distribution (or if other elements of 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) are not satisfied.)  Misdemeanor copyright only incurs a maximum imprisonment of one year and a $100,000 fine.

A person utilizing a technology that is borderline infringement needs some ability to predict the potential consequences if he miscalculates.  That is why I can live with Congress clarifying whether streaming is properly classified as a felony or a misdemeanor (hopefully after a meaningful substantive debate.)  However, I can not live with the inclusion of a catch-all phrase such as "similar new technology" which would make the law less clear and less predictable.

David Makarewicz is an attorney practicing internet law concerning privacy rights and copyright defense for websites and blogs. Visit Dave at Sites and Blogs to keep up with breaking Internet news.

Part 1 & 2 Expert Analysis of Copyright White Paper Below:
Obama Proposes Harsh New Copyright Laws For Internet
White House Seeks to Wiretap Suspected Copyright Infringers

Enter your email address to subscribe to our newsletter:


Delivered by FeedBurner
order non hybrid seeds

Obama Proposes Harsh New Copyright Laws for Internet

Do Obama's Proposed New Copyright Laws Go Too Far? (Part I)

Obama Administration IP Czar Victoria Espinel
David Makarewicz, Contributing Writer
Activist Post

On Tuesday, the White House's Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, Victoria Espinel, provided Congress with a White Paper (available for download here), outlining a series of the Obama Administration's recommended legislative changes to combat online piracy and counterfeiting.  Significantly, the recommendations include making it a felony offense to stream infringing content and giving Federal agencies wiretapping authority to obtain evidence of criminal copyright and trademark offenses.
The White Paper is the product of the IP Czar's review of "existing laws to ensure that they were effective and to identify deficiencies that could hinder enforcement."  The review was conducted in conjunction with a group of federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice and the State Department.

These new proposals, as well as the Obama Administration's recent questionable domain seizures and previous controversial proposed laws, such as COICA, have raised questions about what Obama's legacy will end up being with regard to internet issues.



In the White Paper, Espinel attempts to camouflage some of the potentially controversial recommendations behind lofty goals like health risks, national security, counterfeit drugs and combating criminal gangs.  However, many of the key measures, such as the new wiretapping powers and increased sentencing for repeat offenders, appear to be potentially applicable to any website operator and not limited to any one group or purpose.

Several points of the White Paper also still need to be investigated and clarified.  For example, it requests that Congress change the law to clarify that "infringement by streaming, or by means of other similar new technology, is a felony."  However, there is no attempt to clarify what activities fall into the category of "other similar new technology."  Does this only refer to technology that has not been invented yet?  Are search engines that list streaming sites the type of "other similar new technology" that will be subject to felony charges?

Around the web, the initial reaction to the White Paper is mixed.  CNET hints that we should question the motives behind the Obama Administration's crackdown on copyright infringement by pointing out that "No less than 78 percent of political contributions from Hollywood went to Democrats in 2008, which is broadly consistent with the trend for the last two decades, according to OpenSecrets.org."

Techdirt is more direct with its criticism, pointing out:

The thing is, every time the government ratchets up IP laws in ways that don't match with the way most people view the world, the less respected those laws become. Rather than actually increasing enforcement, these moves decrease respect for those laws.
On the other hand, Ars Technica applauds the fact that "The list largely avoids big controversies—Web censorship, 'three strikes' rules—in favor of a focus on health, safety, and serious criminal activity."

While I agree that these proposals could be worse, I believe the White Paper's potential to arm the United States government with another powerful new set of weapons aimed at websites demands more analysis than I can do in a single article.  Therefore, this will be the introductory post of a multi-part analysis that I will roll out over the course of the next few days that will provide a more detailed review of the recommendations in the White Paper, as well as what these recommendations tell us about the Obama Administration's intellectual property philosophy and agenda.

Part II will review the Government's proposed new wiretap authority for copyright offenses.

David Makarewicz is an attorney practicing internet law concerning privacy rights and copyright defense for websites and blogs. Visit Dave at Sites and Blogs to keep up with breaking Internet news.


Enter your email address to subscribe to our newsletter:


Delivered by FeedBurner
order non hybrid seeds

Friday, March 18, 2011

New Proposal to Wiretap Suspected Infringers Raises Privacy Concerns

This is Part II of a series of articles analyzing specific aspects of the Obama Administration's White Paper (available for download here), recommending legislative changes to combat online piracy and counterfeiting.  Click here for if you missed our overview of the White Paper in Part I.

David Makarewicz, Contributing Writer
Activist Post

One of the most troubling recommendations in the White Paper is the Obama Administration's request for Congress to grant its enforcement agencies the power "seek a wiretap for criminal copyright and trademark offenses."  This would require Congress to amend the Wiretap Act, which does not currently include copyright and trademark infringement among the offenses that justify a privacy invasion as extreme as a wiretap.

In order to preserve the private nature of communications, the Wiretap Act (as amended by the The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986), 18 U.S.C. § 2511, makes it generally illegal for anyone, including the Government, to "intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication." However, the law has carved out certain exceptions to this rule under which the Government can request permission to intercept certain communications for a limited time.

Wiretapping is only permitted for certain types of offenses.  The United States Supreme Court has explained that wiretapping is only permitted "when law enforcement officials are investigating specified serious crimes."


Those serious crimes are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2516, which authorizes a federal agency to intercept "wire or oral communications" if the wiretapping might provide evidence of certain crimes specifically named in the statute.  In addition to the inclusion of obvious crimes like murder, rape or sabotaging a nuclear facility, among the extensive list of serious crimes are sex trafficking, transportation of biological weapons, passport forgery, child pornography and economic espionage.

Although "piracy" is listed, it does not cover online copyright infringement.  The statute is literally referring to a person who "on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy."

In the White Paper, the Obama Administration is asking Congress to amend 18 U.S.C. § 2516 to add copyright and trademark offenses to its list of crimes for which wiretapping is allowed.  However, the Administration provides no clear explanation as to why intellectual property offenses are the types of "serious crimes" that should be listed alongside offenses like those listed above or presidential assassination or terrorist attacks against mass transportation.

The Administration's stated explanation seems more like an attempt to confuse the issue.  Page 11 of the White Paper baldly states:

Wiretap authority for these intellectual property crimes ... would assist U.S. law enforcement agencies to effectively investigate those offenses, including targeting organized crime and the leaders and organizers of criminal enterprises.
It is not clear how we jumped from "those offenses" to "organizers of criminal enterprises."  I can't help but be suspicious of the strange structure of this request.  It seems like the Administration wants us all to focus only on the targeted criminal enterprises and ignore the fact that it would actually be permitting wiretapping for all copyright or trademark infringement.

This would be like asking for the right to use deadly force on all shoplifters, including those attempting to blow up the mall.  If we are only talking about wiretapping criminal enterprises, let's limit the amendment to that.  If we are actually talking about wiretapping individual suspected infringers, let's call it what it is.

Commentators have begun to question whether these types of crimes justify a governmental privacy invasion of the magnitude of wiretapping.  Washington Post blogger Alexandra Petri is also wondering where it will stop.  Petri wrote:
And another suggestion in the white paper — that wiretapping authority be extended to intellectual property crimes — seems troubling, too. Wiretapping? For intellectual property violations? I know it “would assist U.S. law enforcement agencies to effectively investigate those offenses, including targeting organized crime and the leaders and organizers of criminal enterprises,” but so would ordinances that allow you to frisk anyone who has visited an Arby’s, even once, and you don’t see the White House asking for those.
 
Petri is correct to concede that allowing wiretapping would help the government to track down and prosecute copyright infringers.  In addition to the usual reasons to want to wiretap a suspect, without the amendment, if the FBI or DHS wants to investigate a suspected infringer, the Wiretap Act greatly limits their ability to intercept packets en route to or from the infringer's computer.  An en route packet is typically interpreted by courts to meet the statutory definition of an “electronic communication" that can only be intercepted in limited circumstances.

However, even if it would assist investigative efforts, the purpose of the Wiretapping Act was not to give the Government a new crime fighting tool.  It was to limit the Government's ability to trample its citizens' privacy rights by monitoring their communications.

Computer & Communications Industry Association chief Ed Black is going even further.  In an explosive statement, Black said:
Some in Congress and the White House have apparently decided that no price is too high to pay to kowtow to Big Content's every desire, including curtailing civil liberties by expanding wiretapping of electronic communications. Even the controversial USA PATRIOT Act exists because of extraordinary national security circumstances involving an attack on our country. Does Hollywood deserve its own PATRIOT Act?
There are also technical reasons that electronic surveillance should be avoided.  Computer engineer Susan Landau, author of Surveillance or Security? The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping Technologies, warns that building Internet eavesdropping solutions can unwittingly open computers up to non-government spying.  She told NPR last month about a case in Greece in which a cell phone wiretapping system opened a hole so big it allowed spies to monitor the prime minister and other Greek officials.

Additionally, even when a wiretap is authorized, the Internet creates a difficult environment for the trackers.  Last month, the F.B.I. complained to the House Judiciary Committee about the variety of technical problems that prevent them from effectively carrying out an authorized wiretap.

Hopefully, Congress will carefully consider the reasons that only certain serious offenses are presently authorized by the Wiretap Act and not blindly add two seemingly less serious crimes.  At a minimum, the Obama Administration has a responsibility to honestly articulate the reasons that copyright and trademark theft are more important than the privacy rights of its citizens.

David Makarewicz is an attorney practicing internet law concerning privacy rights and copyright defense for websites and blogs. Visit Dave at Sites and Blogs to keep up with breaking Internet news.


Enter your email address to subscribe to our newsletter:


Delivered by FeedBurner
order non hybrid seeds

Tuesday, March 15, 2011

Media Bloggers Association Stands Up To Copyright Troll Righthaven

It is unfortunate that Righthaven and the companies it "buys" the copyrighted property from are willing to financially wreck a person, often for mere carelessness as they are attempting to add to the public conversation.

Media Bloggers Association
David Makarewicz, Contributing Writer
Activist Post

Today, the Media Bloggers Association ("MBA") filed its Reply Brief in theRighthaven, LLC v. Hyatt case.  The MBA is opposing Righthaven's attempt to convince the Nevada District Court to award it $150,000 in damages, the domain name for blogger Bill Hyatt's website (1ce.org)  and attorneys' fees.

Hyatt was sued by Righthaven last October after he allegedly copied a Las Vegas Review-Journalcolumn titled "FX's Manly Man Shows Hold Outsider Appeal."  When Hyatt did not respond to the lawsuit, he was defaulted by the court clerk's office.

A default is basically the equivalent of an admission of all liability by the defendant.  If the default is not set aside, the Court will skip the trial on the merits of the copyright claim and proceed directly to a determination of the damages against Hyatt.

The MBA, a national bloggers organization, filed an Amicus Brief last month against Righthaven.  An Amicus Brief is filed when an organization such as the MBA is not a party to a lawsuit but asks for permission to file a brief as a "friend of the court" that can offer arguments or information to assist the court in making its decision.

In its briefs, the MBA has argued three main points on behalf of bloggers such as Hyatt:

1.  Righthaven is not a legitimate copyright holder because Righthaven publishes nothing itself and only acquires the assignment of rights to the materials after discovering a copyright infringement that will provide the basis for a lawsuit.  Further, the MBA hints that the wording of the assignment of the rights might include a "reversion" that will restore the property rights to the Las Vegas Review-Journal after the lawsuit is concluded.

2.  The Las Vegas Review-Journal is violating Nevada law by “selling lawsuits” to Righthaven.  The MBA argues that if it is not selling lawsuits, the only alternative is that Righthaven is "simply a law firm in disguise, engaged in champerty."  Champerty is where someone without an interest in a lawsuit makes a financial arrangement by which it will fund the suit in exchange for a share of any verdict or settlement.  Most jurisdictions do not permit the practice.

3.  $150,000 and the loss of a domain name are grossly unfair damages that would violate the Due Process clause of the Constitution.  Among other protections, the Due Process clause ensures that a defendant normally is not required to pay damages beyond the amount the plaintiff actually suffered as a result of the defendant's actions.  In this case, MBA argues that the court should limit damages because of the public interest in citizen journalism and the fact that Hyatt was, at worst, an innocent infringer.  The MBA goes even further with its argument against awarding Hyatt's domain name to Righthaven because of the tremendous value of a domain name and Nevada's laws that prohibit a court from awarding personal property in a copyright case.


Righthaven has opposed the MBA's request to file the Amicus Brief and asked the Court to block the MBA from participating in the proceedings against Hyatt.  The Righthaven opposition filing stated, "MBA is by no means a friend of the court.  MBA is clearly acting in an adversarial capacity in defense of a defendant against whom default has been entered."

The MBA has responded that it is only interested in preserving the rights of the bloggers in its organization, not to act as a secret attorney for Hyatt.  In its Reply, the MBA stated, "Contrary to the insinuation by Righthaven, there is no alliance between [the MBA] and Defendant Bill Hyatt."

Internet publishers need to continue to pay close attention to the rulings that come out of all of these Righthaven cases.  The average blogger does not have the resources to simply buy his way out of a lawsuit like Drudge did last month.  Therefore, it is critical to know exactly what the law will and will not permit him to do with other sites' words and photos and exactly what the consequences will be if he ignores the law.

It is unfortunate that Righthaven and the companies it "buys" the copyrighted property from are willing to financially wreck a person, often for mere carelessness as they are attempting to add to the public conversation.  However, if there is an upside, it is that the challenges to these lawsuits, such as this one by the MBA, will hopefully give the Courts the opportunity to create a workable set of guidelines for Internet copyright that eventually puts an end to the uncertainty that allows these extortion schemes to succeed.

David Makarewicz is an attorney practicing internet law concerning privacy rights and copyright defense for websites and blogs.  Visit Dave at Sites and Blogs to keep up with breaking Internet news.

RECENTLY by David Makarewicz:
Jury Says Blogger Forced to Pay Even Though He Did Not Lie
5 Ways DHS Violates The Constitution With Domain Seizures


Enter your email address to subscribe to our newsletter:


Delivered by FeedBurner
order non hybrid seeds