Thursday, February 16, 2012

The "drugs test" for financial products

Steve Levitt points to this paper by Glen Weyl and Eric Posner who aadvocate that all financial instruments should be rigorusly screened for their social utility before they can be traded. They claim that enhanced discolusre and the use of exchanges and clearinghouses, which form the centerpiece of most financial regulation proposals, will not achieve the objective of stabilizing financial markets. They write,

"We argue that disclosure rules do not address the real problem, which is that financial firms invest enormous resources to develop financial products that facilitate gambling and regulatory arbitrage, both of which are socially wasteful activities. We propose that when investors invent new financial products, they be forbidden to market them until they receive approval from a government agency designed along the lines of the FDA, which screens pharmaceutical innovations. The agency would approve financial products if and only if they satisfy a test for social utility. The test centers around a simple market analysis: is the product likely to be used more often for hedging or speculation? Other factors may be addressed if the answer is ambiguous."


The challenge with this proposal would be the definition of social utility. There is a thin line between gambling and hedging, especially with complex derivative instruments. I am not sure whether it is possible to draw any clear distinction between the two. In the circumstances, there is likely to be litigation and lobbying, which will generate incentive distortions that will benefit lawyers, lobbyists, and unscrupulous regulators.

However, a test to verify the exploitation of regulatory arbitrage stands a good chance of success and may also be socially and systemically desirable. After all, any regulation is put in place to address market failures. If market players are allowed to skirt around those regulations, it does not bode well for the stability and health of that market.

Another touchstone could be an examination of the possible conflicts of interest. This should determine who can buy and sell these products. As the events of the past few years show, regulators failed to control even basic, first-level conflicts of interests. Financial institutions like Goldman were peddling derivative products to unsuspecting clients, even as they themselves were shorting the underlying assets. Is it possible to have a code of conduct underlying the transactions for each product?

Thursday, September 15, 2011

"Twisting" on debt maturities as QE3?

The latest dimension to the US Federal Reserve's attempts to lower long-term interest rates through its quantitative easing (QE) program is "Operation Twist". It involves selling short-dated Treasuries (1-3 years) and buying longer-term securities (mostly 7-10 years) in an attempt to push down longer-term yields. These yields affect corporate borrowing and mortgage rates far more than short-term rates.

Hitherto, in the two rounds of QE (QE1 in 2009 was for $750bn, measured in 10-year Treasury equivalents, and QE2 in 2010 was for $412bn), lowering of long-term rates was sought to be achieved through massive purchases of long-term securities. This has involved a huge expansion of the Fed's balance sheet, though the resultant increased monetary base has been mostly confined to banks' reserves. This expansion of monetary base has generated criticism about stoking inflationary fears, weakening the dollar, and spawning other systemic distortions. It has also come in the way of another round of QE.

The new strategy avoids expanding the Fed's balance sheet and seeks to lower long-term rates by swapping short-term debt for longer-term ones. This would not involve any additional balance sheet expansion and would only cause maturity transformation of existing debt portfolio towards the longer-term. In simple terms, it would be merely re-balancing the Fed's portfolio.

It is estimated that by merely "recycling maturing bonds into longer-dated ones", $110bn would be added, and by "actively selling its portfolio of 1-3-year bonds and buying as much long paper as permitted", the Fed could achieve another $390bn. The former involving about $20 bn a month may not enthuse the markets as much as the later which could involve more than $65 bn a month. The Fed at present owns $632bn in Treasuries with a maturity of less than four years. See this Goldman estimate of Fed's possible Operation Twist strategy.



Twisting of the yield curve is not without precedents, though its impact has not been encouraging. It was first used, unsuccessfully, by the US in 1961 and then by Japan, again unsuccessfully, in the nineties. It carries with it certain clear risks. As the FT writes, it "could disrupt trading flows in the bond market, while reducing earnings for banks that borrow cheaply and invest in long-term Treasury debt". It would adversely affect the returns of institutions like insurance companies and pension funds that have large exposure to long-term debt instruments and also the net-interest margins of banks (who invest in long-term bonds).

Finally, it also increases the long-term interest rate risk in the Fed's portfolio, which could, at certain point, constrain the Fed's policy making freedom. Fed would then effectively become a player in the bond markets. And there also exists the probability of making considerable losses when the Fed exits from its current accommodatary stance. It is also being argued that speculation of Operation Twist has already been priced into long-term yields and not much will be achieved with the actual operations.

Update 1 (22/9/2011)

The Fed announces that it would invest $400 billion in long-term Treasury securities over the next nine months, using money raised by selling its holdings of short-term federal debt, in an attempt to drive down interest rates on mortgage loans, corporate bonds and other forms of credit. With this, the Fed hopes to drive down rates not by expanding its portfolio, as it has done twice in recent years, but by shifting its money into riskier long-term investments.

The Fed has amassed more than $1.6 trillion of federal debt. It said that by June 2012 it would sell $400 billion in securities with remaining maturities of less than three years and buy roughly the same amount in securities with maturities longer than six years. It said the result would shift the average maturity of its holdings to 100 months, or more than eight years, from the current average of 75 months, or just over six years.

Lower interest rates so far had not produced the full measure of predicted benefits because lending standards remained unusually strict. Most outstanding mortgages still carry interest rates above 5 percent, despite the availability of lower rates, because it remains difficult to refinance. Tough lending standards are likely to limit the benefits from lowering interest rates. Loans already are cheap, but they are also hard to get.

Monday, August 22, 2011

The institutional cash pools and the demand for safe assets

Gillian Tett points to a possible explanation for the massive investor flight to US Treasuries despite its ratings downgrade by S&P last week. She has an interesting interpretation of an excellent working paper by an IMF economist Zoltan Pozsar that traces the rise of the shadow banking sector over the past two decades to an explosive growth in institutional cash pools during the same time and their preference for safety and counter-party risk diversification.



The paper highlights the spectacular growth in volumes of institutional cash pools in recent years, on the back of the rise of the asset management sector and centralized treasury operations by companies. From just $100 bn two decades back, institutional cash managers now control between $2,000bn and $4,000bn globally. The share of cash held by individual companies has exploded from just over $100 mn across the world to an estimated $75bn with individual securities lenders, $20bn with asset managers, and $15bn with large US companies.











The practice was to invest this liquid cash pool in bank accounts. However, once the US FDIC limited deposit insurance to only upto the first $100,000 of any account from 1990, investors started searching for alternative short-term, liquid, and risk-free investment opportunities. Repurchase deals (backed by collateral), money market funds (often implicitly backed by banks), and highly rated short term securities (such as triple A rated asset backed commercial paper or mortgage bonds) were natural options.



Zoltan Pozsar also finds that institutional cash pools prefer not being intermediated through the traditional banking system, as they prioritize principal safety and portfolio diversification over yield and are hesitant (in many cases due to fiduciary reasons) to take on too much direct, unsecured exposures to banks through even insured deposits. The author writes,



"Between 2003 and 2008, institutional cash pools’ cumulative demand for short-term government guaranteed instruments (as alternatives to insured deposits) exceeded the supply of such instruments by at least $1.5 trillion. The “shadow” banking system rose to fill this vacuum, through the creation of safe, short-term and liquid instruments. Thus, from this perspective the "shadow" banking system was just as much about networks of banks, investment banks and asset managers working together to respond to institutional cash pools’s preference to invest cash at a distance from banks as it was about banks’ funding preferences and off-balance sheet banking. From this perspective, the rise of "shadow" banking has an under-appreciated demand-side dimension to it...



In other words, what looks like undesirable regulatory arbitrage from the perspective of regulated institutions, was desired portfolio diversification from the perspective of institutional cash pools. This is to say that if regulatory arbitrage inspired the pejoratively-sounding term shadow banking, cash portfolio diversification could imply renaming it to market-based banking."




Consequently, it should come as no surprise that in 2007, just 16-20% of these funds were invested in bank deposits, while the rest went into Treasuries, commercial papers, and securities traded in the shadow banking sector, whose emergence coincided with and was maybe even caused by the rapid growth in the institutional cash pools. Once the shadow banking system froze in the aftermath of the sub-prime meltdown, these cash pools have been left with Treasuries as the only remaining investment avenue with the required depth.



The US-EU debt crisis has exacerbated the market uncertainty and accelerated the flight to the safety of US Treasuries. In simple terms, even with all the downside risks associated with the US economy, its government securities appear the least risky among all available alternatives required to accommodate this huge cash pool.

Tuesday, July 26, 2011

The need to regulate consumer finance

One of the most important lessons to be learnt from the sub-prime crisis is the need for better consumer protection in financial markets. In particular, given the shockingly abysmal level of financial literacy among consumers, it was important to provide atleast the most basic level of protection against predatory practices by financial institutions.

In recognition of this imperative, the Dodd-Frank Bill in the US, last year established the Consumer Protection Bureau within the Federal Reserve Board to write and enforce rules protecting consumers of financial products and also increases the authority of state regulators to enforce protections. It would require lenders and sellers of financial products to provide plain-English disclosures, price comparisons with alternative products and clear tripwires before fees are assessed.

This issue assumes much greater relevance in developing countries where financial liberalization of recent years has brought in its wake a proliferation of attractively packaged financial products. The widespread consumer financial illiteracy coupled with skeletal regulation provides fertile ground for predatory lending practices by unscrupulous financiers to unsuspecting borrowers.

A Times article points to the havoc being wreaked by credit card debts, which have also contributed to the extensive economic growth of recent years, in some Latin American countries .

"It has also opened the door to abuses, as credit issuers have used predatory techniques to lure customers, particularly young and less affluent ones, in countries where regulation is scant, annual interest charges can top 220 percent and consumers cannot seek bankruptcy protection, economists and consumer defense groups say... troubling undercurrents in the South American economic boom: indiscriminate lending, lax regulation and ballooning over-indebtedness of large parts of the population, especially those with lower incomes."


And it points to practices that are reminiscent of those of the sterotype of unscrupulous moneylenders, used by certain retailers in Brazil and Chile who peddle consumer durables on credit,

"... among 418,000 clients (of La Polar) in Chile who fell behind on their payments and had their debts repackaged by the retailer La Polar, which raised interest rates and extended loan terms without their knowledge. In early June, it came to light that executives at La Polar had been unilaterally renegotiating clients’ debts for more than six years... The widespread proliferation of credit has been both rapid and relatively recent, developing over the past decade and spurring a consumer revolution across South America. Retail chains like La Polar in Chile and Casas Bahia in Brazil, which sell electronics and housewares, have thrived by offering relatively low-priced goods and extending easy credit terms to entire classes of people who had never had access to it."


While bank-issed credit cards have been regulated, cards issued for in-store use by retailers have enjoyed "light-touch" regulation, thereby setting the stage for a rapidly emerging household indebtedness problem in these countries.

This issue is all the more dangerous for countries like India with a history of extremities of political populism. Credit-driven financial growth has the potential to be the most dangerous form of populism. Unlike conventional electoral populism, involving handing out doles to the electorate which bankrupts the state, credit-driven populism could first bankrupt the households and then the state (in the process of bailing out the banks and the households). This danger is amplified in countries which are in the nascent stages of their financial market growth, where the major share of financial institutions are government owned and financial illiteracy is the norm.

Consider a scenario where the central bank liberalizes (or is forced into) lending regulations on consumer financing (both credit cards and for EMI-based purchases). Predatory lending is never far away and even state-owned banks too enter the fray with several easy-credit schemes. A consumer debt-bubble gets inflated in which a large number of people, especially from the lower middle-class, become exposed. Come elections and the demands start for some form of loan waiver by an electorate socialized into feeling nothing unethical about such demands. It only requires one unscrupulous political party, and there is no dearth of them, to promise write-offs on all consumer debt owed to PSU banks, to force everyone else to follow suit.

That this is not a far-fetched scenario is borne out by the numerous precedents in our history. Loan waivers have been a common feature of our political landscape for decades now. The recent state supported forced write-offs of MFI loans in Andhra Pradesh is a reminder of the vast possibilities of such a trend.

Further, apart from the political populism associated with write-offs, there are factors which strongly encourage such credit growth. For a start, such credit growth drives economic growth. Businesses make profits, consumers are happy borrowing and spending at apparently easy terms and without any hassles, policy makers are satisfied with business investments that create jobs, and bankers are thrilled at the rapid growth of their business (and lending excesses are inevitable). Most importantly, politicians benefit by keeping all these stakeholders satisfied. So where is the incentive to take away the punch-bowl?

It is in this context that more prudent regulation of the sector assumes significance. Such regulation is required to align the incentives of all stakeholders into driving the overall objectives of consumer credit flow. As the experience of Chile and Brazil shows, with increasing financial liberalization, it is only a matter of time before such practices start showing up.

Wednesday, January 5, 2011

Dissertation on Finance

Dissertation on Finance

The proposed acquisition of land by HRI does not seem to fit the original business pattern of HRI as it was set at inception of the company. As the case states the founder of the company engaged HRI in the purchase of underdeveloped acreage, which was then developed, for industrial use. In addition it is stated that the company’s plan from inception had been to deal in only the most potentially profitable land acquisitions. The acquisition of new property seems to in line with the company’s business plan, but since the case explicitly states that it likes to buy undeveloped property, this new proposed purchase might be out of line with the original intentions of the company’s founder. If however the new property is fairly priced as the case states that it then the company may make a wise business decision to buy even though the property is already developed and is currently occupied by a well-built office building. The forecasted increase in EBIT looks attractive at 20%, which might also make the decision a bit easier to make.

2. If HRI uses debt to finance the new acquisition of property then the company may increase the current debt ratio. This increase in the debt ratio could hurt HRI’s triple A rating with bond rating companies, which could in turn drive up the required coupon rate that investors will want in order to supply the capital that HRI needs. The new bond issue will affect the company’s income statement as shown below modified from the example in the case. The case states that their will be an increase in EBIT of 20%.

EBIT $5,292,840
Less: Interest (2,795,000)
Taxable income $2,497,840
Less: Taxes (30%) (749,352)
Profit after-tax $1,748,488

The second option given to the company is a stock offering of 200,000 shares of common stock, which the company will net $30 per share. Issuing common stock has its advantages. No interest payments to make and possibly no downgrade in the company’s rating. In issuing common stock the company will have a new set of challenges to face. First the company must decide what the investors required return will be and then HRI must ensure that it earns an adequate return on it’s assets in order to compensate the investors. HRI must make decisions regarding dividend policy, and must ensure that an adequate amount of growth takes place in order to keep shareholders happy. The third option that the company has is to offer preferred stock at a net to the company of $93.50. This would have the company issuing about 64,171 new shares of preferred stock. With preferred stock yield of 8% HRI will have a mandatory dividend payment to make. This dividend payment would not be tax deductible like the interest payments on a bond issue. The company may wish to offer cumulative preferred to ease investors or, the shareholders may want other provisions that protect their equity investment in the company which might restrict some capital budgeting decisions of the company. Because of the current income offered to shareholders who own the preferred shares the stock can be sold at a premium, there by reducing the total amount of shares issued, which can serve to protect against diluting the equity interests in the company. Given the three financing options available I would choose the bond issue and make them callable to take advantage of downward swings in interest rates. I would also be drawn towards the tax shield available through the bond issue.
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Some useful information in answering question 2 is the amount of total interest payments that the company will be making with the new bond issue. This tells us additional yearly liability the company must prepared for. The applicable tax rate for the company helps us to calculate the tax shield and after tax liability of interest payments. Information about investor sentiment may also be useful to the company before issuing the bonds. A good economic and industrial outlook will help to know where the economy (interest rates) might be heading. This could aid the company in deciding whether or not to offer callable bonds or preferred stock.

HRI’s total debt to total asset ratio before the acquisition is 47.66% and after the acquisition is 52.94%. The company’s times interest earned ratio before the acquisition is 1.86 and after is 1.89. The calculations are below.

Before acquisition:
Total debt/Total assets = $25,500,000/$53,500,000 = 47.66%
Times interest earned = $4,410,700/$2,375,000 = 1.857

After acquisition:
Total debt/Total assets = $25,600,000/$59,800,000 = 52.94%
Times interest earned = $5,292,840/$2,795,000 = 1.89

The difference in the debt-to-asset ratio result from the greater degree of financial leverage in using more debt financing.. There is only a small increase in the times interest earned ratio. This may not be entirely accurate due to no new information being given in the case regarding cost of sales. I assume that this is worked out since it is suggested that we use the EBIT, which would account for revenue and COGS. The small difference in the times interest earned ratio may be due the difference in increased EBIT and the increase in interest as a result of interest payments (in the case of the debt financing).

A sinking fund provision requires that company’s periodically set aside funds that will be used for the retirement of it’s preferred stock issues. The money is used to purchase the preferred stock in the market or to call the stock. Using a sinking fund with a call provision can effectively place a maturity date on preferred stock, which normally does not have a maturity date. This would have the preferred shares selling at lower yields than preferred shares with no sinking fund provision.

This question is similar to question 2. Information about the flotation costs of the new equity issue would have been helpful. Also industry comparisons would have helped. By comparing certain ratios of HRI to the company’s industry peers we can better assess the health of HRI, especially in the context of the proposed acquisition.

A probability estimate regarding EBIT after the purchase can help create “what-if” scenarios that can help the company see as many possible outcomes as is necessary. The estimates can be based on level of income from rents derived from the building or on the salvage value of the building, possible sale price. A probability estimate after the purchase can help the company gauge when to possibly sell the property or to most efficiently manage the property. For example if the probability estimate tells management that there is 65% chance that increased income generated from the property (the case says the company will keep the property and manage the building) will drop by 25% in fourth year (found from industry forecasts) then the company might know when and how to prepare for a change in the value of the property or cash flow or how to diversify itself so if the possible outcome does occur will have no ill affect to the companies earnings to serve protect shareholders.

Alternatives to financing the new property have been provided. I assume the finance department is aware of the flotation costs, and other issuance costs associated with the new common and preferred stock issues, and other costs data for the debt issue is provided. The investment bankers should provide how the new equity issue might change the EPS of the company’s stock, and perhaps an industry outlook as it relates to the new investment purchase. The bankers could also provide to the company protective provisions that preferred shareholders might want or need in order to invest in the stock. Likewise the investment bankers may act as the bond trustee working with the bondholders and overseeing the relationship between the bondholders and the bond issuer. Then the investment bankers could provide the indenture, which provides the specific terms of the credit, the bondholders’, rights, the issuer’s rights, and responsibilities of the investment banker or bond trustees.

If debt is used to finance the new acquisition then HRI will be dealing with a new total debt to total asset ratio of 52.94%. At the company’s current constraint of a maximum of a 55% debt to asset ratio, the company is left with the ability to have 2.06% in additional borrowing.

The flexibility of financing comes in how easy the company can manage certain requirements of that particular financing such as debt interest payments. The bond issue will legally obligate the company to make interest payments to bondholders. The after-tax cost of debt is 4.90% (7.00%(1 - .30)). The company itself can set the yield on the preferred stock so long as it is in a feasible investment range for investors. The ease at which these requirements can be met can help to define the flexibility of the financing alternative. In these terms the most flexible financing alternative is the common stock issue since HRI does not have pay any dividend if it chooses not to. I would say the most risky financing alternative is the bond issue since a failure to make interest payments may lead to bankruptcy. Also in terms of risk is the probability estimation as it relates to the new investment. For example, what is the probability that the proposed investment will actually increase EBIT by 20%? A probability estimate will show the inherent risk in owning the new property from an investment perspective. In the case of income we can measure in terms of after-tax profits that the company can generate on new assets being purchased with the new financing. Obviously the higher the percentage return on investment the better. How the company’s income will be affected by the new financing is also a major concern; how the new financing alternatives affect the key earnings ratios. This could be called financial risk, which is a direct result of the firm’s financing decision. This risk applies to the additional risk or variability of earnings available to common shareholders, and the additional chance of insolvency to the common shareholders caused by the use of additional financial leverage. In terms of income, business risk is a concern. Business risk refers to the variability in earnings before taxes and interest has been paid. Business risk is a result of the company’s investment decision.

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Saturday, January 30, 2010

ACDC 2010 Call for Papers

Fourth Annual Conference on Development and Change
Johannesburg, South Africa, April 9–11, 2010

Conference Theme
The world economy is currently in the throes of a global economic crisis reminiscent of the great depressions of the 1930s and possibly that of the 1870s. As back then, the crisis resulted from major structural imbalances in financial and credit markets ultimately resulting in a retreat from free trade. Emergent debates about resurgent protectionism, alternative reserve currencies, stimulus packages and climate change policies suggests that the world economy has entered a phase of heightened change which will transform the development "equation" in varied and diverse ways. It is imperative at this time that development economists should engage with two crucial questions: the implications of these changes for the developing world and the prospects for "development" for the majority of people in the developing world.

The forthcoming conference invites submission of academic papers representing original and critical research focusing on the various aspects of the current global economic crisis. Papers are encouraged to employ historical and comparative perspectives where possible, on the impact of the current global financial and trade crises and its impact on the economic performance of developing countries. A focus on policy relevance and prescriptions for developing countries is highly recommended.

Contact conference director Ashwini Deshpande or visit Policy Innovations to download the full details. The deadline has been extended to February 10, 2010.

Tuesday, January 5, 2010

The People's Choice: Carnegie Council Top Ten 2009

2009 was a hard year on many fronts and this feeling was reflected in the Carnegie Council audience favorites. Concerns include making sense of the financial crisis; predicting future risks; and coming up with new strategies for the 21st century.

No. 7 on the list, "Top Risks and Ethical Decisions, 2009," was so popular that on January 13 a similar panel will predict their "Top Risks" for 2010 (with live webcast).

1. The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World
Niall Ferguson, Harvard University (video, audio, transcript)
The economies of China and America are so entwined that neither can afford to let the other fail.

2. The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century
George Friedman, Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (video, audio, transcript)
Which nations will be the winners and losers? These predictions may surprise you.

3. Sex Trafficking: Inside the Business of Modern Slavery
Siddharth Kara, Free the Slaves (video, audio, transcript)
The biggest illegal business after drugs, sex slaves generated profits of $35.7 billion in 2007.

4. On Promoting Democracy
Michael Walzer, Institute for Advanced Study (article)
States are not the only, or even the most important, agents of regime change.

5. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa
Dambisa Moyo, Economic specialist, Sub-Saharan Africa (video, audio, transcript)
Decades of international aid have only made things worse in Africa.

6. The Balance between Risk and Return Is Everybody's Business
Ann Rutledge, R&R Consulting (article)
Risk has shifted from corporations to individuals, and many ordinary Americans got burned.

7. Top Risks and Ethical Decisions, 2009
Ian Bremmer, Eurasia Group; Art Kleiner, Booz & Company; Michele Wucker, World Policy Institute; Thomas Stewart, Booz & Company (video, audio, transcript)
This expert panel predicts risks for what they agree will be a very tough year.

8. The Crisis of Islamic Civilization
Ali A. Allawi, former Iraq government official (video, audio, transcript)
What caused the decline of Islamic civilization and how can it be revived?

9. The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century
Anne-Marie Slaughter, U.S. State Department (video, audio, transcript)
Who's right, the neocons or the liberal internationalists?

10. Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?
Michael Sandel, Harvard University (video, audio, transcript)
A lively debate with the audience on what we owe to society.

Thursday, June 25, 2009

Mexico's Proposed Climate Change Green Fund

The climate negotiations in Copenhagen will need to determine how we finance adaptation and green technology for the developing world. To this end, Mexico has been floating a proposal for a World Climate Change Fund for at least a year now.

Some of the ideas and principles driving the Green Fund are outlined in a presentation on Innovative Finance Mechanisms by Carolina Fuentes. She suggests that the fund would have the following advantages:

–Increased access to financial and technical resources
–Expansion of the global mitigation scale, Developing countries will have positive incentives to widen their mitigation efforts.
–Broader participation, The governance scheme of the Fund will be open to all countries.
–A predictable and verifiable regime, activities will be subject to independent supervising.
–Not necessary to demonstrate additionality, since the Fund is not a compensatory mechanism to offset emissions.

Is it a promising sign that the U.S. embassy in Mexico City included the proposed Green Fund in a February memo?

Thursday, April 2, 2009

South Centre Statement on the Impact of Economic Crisis on Developing Countries

South Centre Executive Director Martin Khor made the following statement (3/25) to a special UN General Assembly dialogue on the world financial and economic crisis and its impact on development:

1. The extraordinarily serious global economic crisis has its origins in the developed countries. Developing countries are not responsible, but they are severely affected, and in ways that are worse than the developed countries, as they also lack the means to counter the effects.

2. Developing countries are only in the past few months beginning to feel the effects of the crisis, due to the lag time in transmission. The crisis will certainly last longer than originally expected, and then it may take even more time before a full recovery.

3. There is thus growing anxiety in the developing world. When he met the British Prime Minister Mr. Gordon Brown, last week, as part of the preparation for the G20 Summit, the Ethiopian Prime Minister Mr. Meles Zenawi warned that African countries could face political chaos if the recession hits at full force. In developed countries such as Britain, the worst problem being faced in the downturn was unemployment. But in Africa, the recession means that "people who were getting some food would cease to get it and instead of being unemployed they would die", said Mr. Zenawi, as quoted in the Financial Times.

4. The developing countries are being hit through two transmission levels—trade and finance. The first transmission channel is through trade. There has been a sudden and steep fall in manufacturing exports, the fall being 30 to 50 percent in many Asian countries. Then there is the fall in demand, prices and export earnings for commodities, affecting especially low-income commodity-dependent countries. On 17 March, The Economist's commodity-price dollar index for all items had fallen by 40 percent compared to a year ago (with declines of 29 percent for food, 44 percent for non-food agriculture products and 56 percent for metals). Earnings from services are also falling, for example in tourism (in the Caribbean tourist arrivals are expected to fall by one third this season) and migrant workers' remittances (a 6 percent drop is estimated by the World Bank for 2009).

5. The second transmission channel is through finance. There is a rapid decline of bank loans to developing countries, whose companies may find it difficult to roll the many hundreds of billions of dollars of foreign loans due this year. There is a reversal of portfolio investment into developing countries, from large inflows in recent years to a sudden huge exit. Net capital flows to emerging markets fell from $929 billion in 2007 to $466 billion in 2008 and will fall further to $165 billion in 2009, according to the estimates by Institute of International Finance. Even FDI is rapidly slowing down because of difficulties in access to credit and economic contraction. If the past record is a guide, aid flows can also be seriously affected in the near future. Trade financing has also been affected by risk aversion, and is choking trade flows; a shortfall of $25 billion in trade financing was reported at a recent WTO meeting.

6. These trade and financial shocks are leading to stresses on the overall balance of payments, with a fall in foreign reserves, and a depreciation of the local currency in some countries. All these together threaten developing countries' ability to service their external debt and avoid a debt default situation. There are already 10 countries that have had to go to the IMF for emergency loans and many other countries are likely to be lining up in the near future.

7. All of the above are causing a stress on the real economy, with declines in GNP and industrial output, a reversal in poverty eradication and a slowdown in social development, as governments face reduced revenues and budgetary stress. Most developing countries are constrained from taking the fiscal expansion measures similar to those of developed countries.

8. There is a need for developing countries to examine the options for national policy on each aspect of the economic crisis and to seek the appropriate policies. However, only some policy measures can be taken at national level, especially if the country is too small to rely on the boosting of domestic-led growth. Regional-level measures are important. And most critical are the reforms, actions and cooperative measures required at the international level.

9. The South Centre views the two issues of reform international actions needed to counter the recession from the perspective of the problems and interests of the developing countries. What are the priority issues for the developing countries, on which action is urgently required?

10. Among the priorities for the South are (1) establishing an international system that fosters financial stability for developing countries; (2) having access to adequate and stable financial resources, as private flows and exports decline; (3) avoidance of financial and debt crises and proper management of crises if they occur; (4) unimpaired access to markets for goods and services; (5) avoiding collateral damage from policies taken by developed countries in response to the crisis; (6) formulating policies for the short and long term for recovery and development, and being able to maintain and expand policy space to implement these policies.

11. There is need to review and reform the international financial and economic systems to ensure the problems that led to the crisis are not repeated and that the international system does not prevent but positively encourages developing countries to have the adequate policy space to deal with the crisis nationally.

12. There are dangers that some crisis measures taken by developed countries may have adverse effects on the South, and thus a need to prevent or offset these actions. For example, developed countries' agriculture subsidies used to be the main distortion in world trade but these are now accompanied by huge subsidies to financial institutions and emerging subsidies to manufacturing (the auto industry). Developing countries lack funds to match these subsidies; they should be allowed to take measures to prevent subsidized service providers like banks and subsidized goods from overwhelming their domestic markets. In the area of tariffs, developing countries should be allowed to exercise their right to use the policy space to raise their applied tariff if it is below the bound tariff. A moratorium against raising applied tariffs would be imbalanced because there is little difference between the applied and bound rates in developed countries, unlike the developing countries.

13. Private investors and public agencies in some developing countries invested in or lent to private and public institutions in developed countries. Developed countries' governments should assure that the assets of developing countries are protected. Pressures from interest groups that exclude developing countries' assets or loans from bailout plans (for example, the suggestion that AIG should only honor claims from nationally owned institutions) should be resisted.

14. New forms of trade protection that affect developing countries should not be introduced. The fiscal stimulus programs should not exclude goods and services from developing countries, as has happened with the Buy American clause in the recent US stimulus package. Developed countries are mainly exempted from the clause due to their membership of the WTO plurilateral procurement agreement, of which most developing countries are not members. There is also need to guard against a new trade protectionist element being proposed in the climate policies and legislation of some developed countries; if this is introduced, it could have a further adverse effect on developing countries' exports and add more stress in this crisis period.

15. A high priority for developing countries is to establish international measures to foster financial stability and avoid activities driven by speculation. The crisis originated from banking deregulation and excessive liquidity creation, causing speculation to be rife in capital and currency markets. Developing countries have been hit by these speculative activities leading to violent fluctuations in capital flows. But because of highly costly self-insurance taken in large stock of reserves, these swings have not created the kind of dislocations seen in 1997 in Asia. An important part of the solution is to reinstall firewalls and regulations to avoid speculative capital flows unrelated to real economic activities (trade and investment) and to establish a system of currency exchange where currency rates reflect underlying fundamentals. This should be a major priority in the reform of the international financial architecture.

16. In the absence of reform and an international system regulating these flows, developing countries must have the policy space and be allowed to undertake national policy measures to regulate capital flows and to defend themselves from speculation. However the required policy space to take the required measures is hindered by (1) IMF-World Bank conditionality that mandates an open capital account; (2) Many North-South free trade agreements that (a) mandate the free and unregulated inflow and outflow of funds; (b) liberalization of financial services, including the entry of foreign institutions for "new financial instruments;" (c) liberalization and deregulation of investments. These barriers (the loan conditionality and the FTA provisions) to the required regulation should be reviewed. Existing FTAs should be reviewed to consider amending clauses that prevent the required regulation. Current negotiations on FTAs such as the EPAs between the EU and the African and Pacific countries should fully take this into account.

17. A major plank of the new financial architecture is the reform of the IMF. Its policy conditionalities have previously not been appropriate in assisting developing countries deal with crises. These include: (1) the policy of an open capital account system, that deregulates capital flows (increasing financial vulnerability) and discourages or prevents capital controls over inflows and outflows; (2) pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies that have magnified contractionary conditions; (3) trade policy linked to extreme liberalization of imports and industrial policy based on non-state intervention, which have damaged domestic agriculture and industry in many developing countries. A preliminary review of recent crisis loans to 10 countries (including some developing countries) by the IMF show that contractionary financial and fiscal policies (such as a significant increase in interest rates, and a reduction of government spending) are still maintained as part of the loan conditions.

18. A reform of the IMF is thus crucial. Without the reform, it is premature to expand its resources. The IMF should not impose or promote an open capital account or prevent regulation of capital flows. It should not deal with trade and industrial policies and other development-related policies. The reform process should lead to its creditor role being confined to providing short-term loans to countries to deal with temporary balance of payments difficulties. In that area, its policies should be counter-cyclical and not pro-cyclical. Countries should not be requested to provide loans to the IMF to augment its resources because this would compromise the ability of the IMF to carry out its surveillance function and to discipline the policies of countries that provide the loans. It can obtain resources from the market or from the issuance of SDRs, instead of obtaining loans from governments. The imbalances in the system of governance, with its present serious imbalance in voting rights and decision-making, should also be addressed.

19. One major source of financial instability is that the international reserve currency is the currency of a single country (the United States). This causes instability as availability of reserves for the world economy depends on the reserve currency country (the US) having growing current account deficits. This problem is worsened under the present crisis because of: (a) the absence of multilateral discipline over exchange rate and macroeconomic policies of the US; (b) developing countries' increased vulnerability to fluctuations in capital flows and exchange rates; (c) pro-cyclical behavior of financial markets; (d) developing countries holding large stocks of foreign reserves at very high costs. As an alternative, an international reserves system based on the SDRs could be established. The IMF could distribute SDRs to itself to make it available to members, and there should be greater automaticity in access to it.

20. The new financial architecture should include establishment of a multilateral fund or funds. This could be similar to the two oil facilities set up in the 1970s to assist countries cope with the oil price increases and to prevent a global recession. The fund can assist developing countries counter the recession and to offset the multiple losses of financing caused by reduced exports, migrant remittances, service payments, loans, investments, trade financing, etc. The shortfall facing developing countries may total many hundreds of billions of dollars a year. The fund should thus be of a major amount. The channels of funding and its multiple uses should be determined together by the international community.

21. Developing countries should also be encouraged to explore and expand regional financial cooperation. Examples of this are the Chiang Mai Initiative and its extension in Asia, and the Bank of the South in Latin America.

22. The new financial architecture should also deal with the threat of new debt crises facing developing countries. The current account and overall balance of payments of many developing countries and their foreign reserves are or will be coming under increasing stress, due to a crisis that was not of their doing. The reform process should establish as a priority an international system of debt standstill and debt workout for countries that face debt servicing difficulties. Proposals on this (which originated at UNCTAD) had been rather extensively discussed, including at the IMF, but did not lead to any conclusions. Given the present crisis, this should again be a priority proposal. A new round of debt elimination and debt relief should also be looked at now.

23. For many of the poorer countries, dependence on commodities has revived as a serious problem because the positive conditions and high prices of the past several years have vanished. The stabilization of commodity prices and fair remuneration to producing countries has thus become a priority crisis issue for developing countries. International cooperation on resolving commodity issues should thus be on the reform agenda.

24. The crisis provides an opportunity to address the deficits and imbalances in the governance of global finance and economic issues. The United Nations used to play a central role in policy formulation and in reaching and implementing agreements. However in recent years, too much faith and power had been given instead to the markets and to international financial institutions which supported the drive towards "marketization" and "financialization." At the national level, in developed countries in the centre of the storm, the pendulum has swung, with the leadership and interventionist role of the state being emphasized. The international counterpart of this national-level development should be the strengthening of the role of the United Nations, including its General Assembly and its economic arms, particularly ECOSOC. Greater authority provided to a strengthened and more effective UN should be a crucial element of the new global economic architecture.

25. The UN General Assembly high-level conference in June is an important opportunity for discussion and follow-up actions on the wide range of issues of the crisis and how it affects development, and the remedies required. The South Centre is willing to contribute to the success of this very important event.