Can You See Nations?

It may strike you as odd that I am bringing into question the utility of the nation-state during Russia’s military action in Georgia. But I would argue that conflicts over nationhood only make my point: the pervasive understanding of statecraft as being strictly in the interest of the “nation-state” may obscure the nature of the threats that face humanity.

The ideas of a European Union and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were considered radical years before those projects started. At the very least, we on this Earth must realize that we are all in the same boat, and our destinies are tied to one another. We don’t have to be wedded to a concept, the nation-state, that is fuzzy to begin with and destructive when abused.

That is the basic point I argued in an essay that appeared in a roundtable discussion with Nick Gvosdev and David Andelman. My original salvo was also syndicated through Project Syndicate, appearing in several newspapers around the world in multiple languages. From what I can tell, the piece has appeared in the Japan Times, the South China Morning Post, the Cyprus Mail, the Daily Times (Pakistan), the Brunei Times, the Daily News (Egypt), El Nuevo Diario (Nicaragua), as well as Policy Innovations. Project Syndicate is an incredible concept: Syndicate opinion pieces and make them available in numerous language (mine was translated into French, Russian, Czech, Spanish, Chinese, and German).

In any case, here is the original piece. My argument may be a bit unusual, but I hope it helps move a useful debate. Let me know what you think. I put the piece on the blog because several people expressed interest in commenting on it.

Ending the Nation-State Myth

This fall, thousands of college students will be taught a myth presented as fact. It is a myth that has helped fuel wars and may hinder finding solutions to the world's biggest problems. Though the origin of this myth is cloudy, science has proven its falsity, and a globalized world has rendered it anachronistic. I am talking about the nation-state.

The nation-state myth conflates two ideas, one that is concrete, the state, and one that is fuzzy, the nation. The utility of the state is clear. It is a necessary organizing principle that allows people to pool their resources for the common good and mobilize against common threats, whether they are floods or invading armies. The state is also the final arbiter of law. State power is even on the rise, partly as a backlash to globalization and as a result of growing wealth from energy markets.

But the nation-state as a basis for statecraft obscures the nature of humanity's greatest threats. Pollution, terrorism, pandemics, and climate change are global phenomena. They do not respect national sovereignty, and, therefore, they necessitate global cooperation.

The origin of the nation-state idea is unclear. Most agree that it offered a way to consolidate and legitimize a state's rule over a group of people, whether defined by a common language, culture, or ethnicity. The problem is that the contours of a cultural community rarely coincide with a political entity.

Nor does the ideal of national unity account for internal diversity and conflict. Identities within nations are fluid, even from minute to minute. About 15 years ago, I spent a summer in France's Loire Valley. As many travelers to France will attest, people in the French countryside believe that they, not Parisians, constitute the "true" France.

This division of core and periphery is common in many countries. But I also noticed that a person's identity would change during the course of a conversation. "We French" would give way to "We Gauls," "We Latins," "We Bretons," "We Franks," or "We Europeans" depending on the topic. This ever-changing identity was startling, but, on second thought, it made sense: after all, Charles de Gaulle famously said that it is difficult to govern a country with 246 types of cheese.

China is often thought to be governed by the Han majority. But this group is linguistically, culturally, and even genetically diverse. As the author Ian Buruma recently mused, it is not clear what people mean by "China." Taiwan is an independent state but is officially part of China. Chinese culture and language has spread all over the world. "China" is much more than just a nation-state, Buruma concludes. Taiwanese scholar Lee Hsiao-feng has recently argued that the concept "Chinese" is a meaningless word that was fabricated to justify rule over minorities.

It is difficult to imagine a nation that is confined to one state or a state that contains one nation. Some argue that Japan is an example of a nation-state. In countless heated discussions, I have reminded many Japanese that the Japanese people actually comprise Ainu, Koreans, Chinese, Filipinos, and Ryuku. Their response is always: "Yes, but we want to believe that there is a Japanese people." They even have a field of study devoted to examining what it means to be Japanese.

Like religion, the nation-state myth requires a leap of faith. Japanese scholar Yoshihisa Hagiwara argues that since it is not grounded in fact, the nation-state myth is bound to dissolve, giving way to an understanding that we are merely individuals who are part of a global community. He laments that the Japanese are especially fond of the idea of "Japaneseness," making it possible that Japan may become the "last hero" of a dying ethos.

Expressions of this notion appear in popular culture. A recent credit card commercial depicts a father and son traveling to Norway to trace their family's origins. After bonding over local beer, food, sweaters, and swimming, they discover their family is actually from Sweden.

If I were to take that trip, I might have gone to Ireland to discover that my Irish ancestors were originally from Scotland. But where were the Scots from? Just across another sea, perhaps. The origin myth continues ad infinitum until we reach humanity's common ancestor, or an actual myth—a black egg in China, a spear in the ocean in Japan, or the interaction of fire and ice in France.

If policymakers are to address today's problems, they must think more broadly. One place to start may be to reexamine the concept of the nation-state, which students around the world are taught is the basic unit of international relations. Beyond the core Realist theories of balance of power, an introduction to ethics in international affairs—moral philosophy, human rights, and the role of nonstate actors—should be mainstreamed in international relations curricula.

As the philosopher Peter Singer showed in his book One World, a united front against the biggest problems facing the world will require a fundamental shift in attitude—away from parochialism and toward a redefinition of self-interest. Enlightened self-interest can be state-based, but interests would be redefined to encompass universal principles such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If these interests are to gain universal recognition, we will need to shed the nation-state myth once and for all.

Language, the Great Communicator

I debated soft power with Joshua Kurlantzick last night at the Core Club in New York City.

One of the things I argued was that the United States is becoming less exceptional relative to other countries in the world. While Americans have seen themselves a part of an exceptional power--a city on a hill, a beacon of freedom--globalization and the international system have in fact empowered rival countries to become relatively more powerful. Fareed Zakaria makes a similar point in his new article "The End of Exceptionalism" in Newsweek.

Here is an excerpt:

"[A new Pew survey on global attitudes] highlights the fact that that the United States is becoming the odd country out. The most striking statistic in the survey has to do with trade. Thumping majorities everywhere said that growing trade ties between countries are "very good" or "somewhat good"—91 percent in China, 85 percent in Germany, 88 percent in Bulgaria, 87 percent in South Africa, 93 percent in Kenya and so on. Of the 47 countries surveyed, the one that came in dead last was … America, at 59 percent. The only country within 10 points of us was Egypt."

Brent Scowcroft makes the point in the National Interest in an article that asks whether the United States is becoming the dispensable nation:

"...we are not indispensable in the sense that those of us in Washington are the only ones who know what needs to be done for the good of the entire human race, and that the rest of the world can either join us or be against us. And we have discovered over the last decade that it is increasingly difficult for us to build together any meaningful sort of coalition acting on that belief. It doesn’t provide leadership and only engenders resistance."

Much of this shift is due to the changing nature of power (toward nonstate actors and to nontraditional combatants), the increasingly globalized nature of problems (climate change, pandemics), and the upside of globalization (states have tapped the global economic growth engine to narrow the gap).

Another question that came up last night was: What role will language play in the emergence of China as a rival power? Clearly, language does matter (this article says English speakers and Chinese speakers look at math problems differently).

But how does language relate to power? In terms of soft power, should we say that when more business is done in Chinese than in English, we have reached some kind of tipping point? Or when Chinese stop learning English and mentioning Western concepts like democracy (Hu mentions democracy 60 times in his speech this week), will we witness a new global order? I am betting it won't happen soon. More likely, we will see a convergence that embraces universal values.

The discussion reminds me of the recent concern about the death of many languages. Every 14 days, a language dies. (Here is a discussion on this trend in Global Voices in which many French speakers weigh in.) I have been following this topic and it seems that the argument for lamenting the disappearance of languages is that thousands of years of knowledge embedded in each language will be lost.

OK. But isn't language's primary function to communicate? When more people speak the same language, more communication is possible. Greater communication, in theory, reduces conflict. It also exposes human rights abuses and other problems word wide--as Nick Gvosdev argued in his excellent piece "Reversing Babel."

Finally, it is curious to note that two of the five hotspots for language disappearance are in North America and four of the five hotspots are in the G8.

"World Without the West" at the Nixon Center

I had a chance to respond to Steve Weber in person yesterday at the Nixon Center on his excellent "World Without the West" article in the National Interest. Editor Nick Gvosdev (he blogs about it here) convened about 40 senior scholars, government officials, and writers to discuss Weber's provocative article, which warns of alternative power centers--namely in China, India, and Russia--in the international system.

Weber's research shows that these three economies are integrating more rapidly with the developing world than one would expect. He suggests that the United States either: 1. try to stop these economies from integrating more rapidly with the developing world; 2. vie for contested relationships (or "make more friends" as I put it); or 3. do nothing and allow this group of economies to do what they will.

I initially lead the critique online--on the National Interest's website here. As I mentioned yesterday, the World Without the West argument ignores the inevitability of economic change between the RICs. It is likely that one of the three economies will grow faster than the other two, changing their relationships and shared interests. As the gap between these economies grows, their relationships with the developing world will also change. Second, these three rising powers face pressures for more transparent, accountable governance from three sources—pressure from their citizens, bilateral partners and the international community.

Third, these three states have little in common with one another. Moreover, when I ask Russians or Chinese about the potential for cooperation between the two, they look at me like I am telling them a joke. As one commenter said yesterday, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is "meaningless." Meanwhile, India is a ball of paradoxes just like any other state. The National Interest actually published an article about this point in the same edition--the article is John Thomson's "Inconclusive India," which ends on an optimistic note about Indian society:

"...it became clear to me that India can continue to build on its current momentum if the people and government coalesce around principles of responsibility, charity and restraint. To do so, they will need to successfully embrace a broad spectrum of issues—most particularly values that are personified by the father of independent India," Thomson writes.

I ended my comments by offering a few thoughts for discussion. First, ethics and leadership are linked. A power that is unethical is unsustainable. In other words, if a rising power is viewed as immoral, illegitimate, or not benign, the classic balance of threat mechanism snaps in to place and countries will likely balance against the perceived divergence in values.

Second, which actors drive norms in the international system? It is no longer just the state. These days, civil societies, consumers, and corporations are increasingly at the forefront of addressing problems of climate change to labor abuse--far ahead of governments.

Finally, where do liberal values come from? Are they the result of a culture's experience with philosophical traditions or are they the pragmatic result of interactions between international businesses? In other words, transparency and accountability are not only right but they also facilitate business relationships.

The Nixon Center will be posting a summary of the event soon. To read more about it, visit their site here.